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I. INTRODUCTION
HIS Article focuses on the interpretations of, and changes relating
to, oil, gas and mineral law in Texas from October 1, 1995 through
September 30, 1996. The cases examined include decisions of
courts of the State of Texas and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.'
II. CONVEYANCING ISSUES
Temple-Inland Forest Products Corp. v. Henderson Family Partnership,
Ltd.2 is a case on the mineral/royalty distinction which finds that the
deeds in question reserved a 1/16 mineral interest stripped of appurtenant
rights other than the right to receive royalties, rather than a 1/16 fixed
royalty interest. The deeds first clearly conveyed an undivided 15/16ths
of the minerals, and then recited: "In respect to the undivided one-six-
teenth (1/16th) part of and interest in the oil, gas and other minerals re-
tained and reserved by the Grantor in said land, it is understood and
agreed that said one-sixteenth (1/16th) interest is and shall always be a
* B.A., Rice University; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Attorney-at-Law,
Brown, Richards & Fortunato, P.C., Amarillo, Texas.
1. This Article is devoted exclusively to Texas law. Cases involving questions of oil,
gas and mineral law, decided by courts sitting in Texas but applying laws of other states, are
not included.
2. 911 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1996, writ requested).
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royalty interest .... ,"3 The deeds go on to convey to the grantee as to the
reserved interest: (1) the right to develop, (2) the right to lease, (3) the
right to bonus, and (4) the right to delay rentals. Thus, of the five attrib-
utes of a mineral interest, grantor retained only the right to receive roy-
alty. The issue then was whether this bare royalty right was an attribute
of a reserved mineral interest, or a 1/16 fixed royalty.
The court cited French v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.4 for the proposition that
a conveyance of a mineral interest with reservations of all of the attrib-
utes of a mineral interest, except the right to receive royalty, was still a
conveyance of a mineral estate. The court then concluded that these
deeds were simply the reverse of that same circumstance. That is, the
grantors reserved a mineral estate and conveyed all of the attributes of a
mineral estate, except the right to receive royalty. Therefore, the interest
reserved was still a mineral interest.5 In support of its construction, the
court relied upon the "four corners rule" and the rule that "a deed should
be construed against the grantor."'6 As to the express recitals in the deeds
that the "interest is and shall always be a 'royalty interest,"' the court
held that such a reference "cannot serve to create a royalty interest with-
out an express reference to royalties for actual production of minerals
.. . .,,This was the controlling factor in Watkins v. Slaughter8 and
French.9 The dissent believes that Watkins presented the identical issue
and argued that the reserved interest was a 1/16th royalty.10
Russell v. City of Bryan1 considered whether the successors-in-interest
to the grantor under an instrument conveying land for use as a park re-
tained the mineral rights. The deed of dedicati6n recited:
That I, Tyler Haswell... subject to the conditions hereinafter set out,
do hereby Dedicate, and by these presents have Dedicated unto the
City of Bryan ... the following described tract...
The purposes and conditions of Dedication are as follows:
1. That said tract of land is to be used for a park and play-ground
for the people of the City of Bryan, under such rules and regulations
as may be prescribed . ... 12
The instrument goes on to describe certain conditions under which own-
ership might revert to Haswell and his successors. The principal condi-
tion is the failure of the city to use the land as a park.
The court held that the use of the term "dedicate" alone fails to estab-
3. Id. at 532.
4. 896 S.W.2d 795 (Tex. 1995).
5. Temple-Inland, 911 S.W.2d at 534.
6. Id. at 534-35.
7. Id. at 535.
8. 144 Tex. 179, 189 S.W.2d 699 (1945).
9. 896 S.W.2d at 797.
10. Temple-Inland, 911 S.W.2d at 537.
11. 919 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ denied).
12. Russell v. City of Bryan, 797 S.W.2d 112,113-14 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1990, writ denied).
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lish, as a matter of law, Haswell's intent to grant only an easement.1 3
There are cases under other circumstances holding that a "dedication"
may convey a fee or may convey an easement only. 14 However, having
previously determined that the Haswell deed was ambiguous, the jury's
finding that Haswell did not intend to convey only the surface was
controlling.15
Eland Energy, Inc. v. Rowden Oil & Gas, Inc.'6 involved a farmout
under which the Farmee was obligated to reconvey the entire drilling
lease at the end of the drilling program, except for "40 acres in the form
of a square as nearly as possible" in a restricted depth around each pro-
ducing well.17 Farmor conveyed the entire lease to Farmee, subject to the
farmout agreement.18 The court apparently assumed that the Farmee was
to designate the forty-acre units.' 9 A long time elapsed after the comple-
tion of the last well. Farmee refused to make the reconveyance, contend-
ing that the statute of limitations had run on the obligation to reconvey
and that "40 acres in the form of a square as nearly as possible" around
each well was unenforceable under the statute of frauds, because the
lands were not sufficiently described. Farmor sued for declaratory relief
and to quiet title.
The court held that Farmee was obligated to reconvey the lease, except
as to the forty-acre tracts designated around each well.20 Farmee con-
tended that the lease assignment conveyed the complete title with a cove-
nant to convey back the forty-acre units. Because more than four years
had elapsed since the last well was completed, Farmee argued that the
action was time barred. The court rejected this argument and held that
the Farmor always held the equitable title, i.e., the right to legal title as to
all lands outside the forty-acre units.21 Because Farmor never gave up its
title, this was not an action for specific performance to convey land, but
an action to clear title, which is not subject to the four-year statute of
limitations.22
Although it was not entirely clear under the facts whether Farmor or
Farmee was to designate the forty-acre tracts, in response to Farmee's
challenge that the forty-acre tracts were unenforceable legal descriptions,
the court held that the right to make the designation was an equitable
right in Farmee to perfect title by selecting the boundaries of each forty-
acre tract earned.23 The right to designate is a right that may be lost by
delay, but under the facts of this case, Farmee's delay was not fatal. The
13. Russell, 919 S.W.2d at 703.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 703-04.
16. 914 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1995, writ denied).
17. Id. at 182.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 187.
20. Id. at 186.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 187.
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right to make the designation, coupled with an interest in doing so, satis-
fies the requirements of the statute of frauds.24
This case is significant because it is quite common to see farmouts and
other similar agreements with reconveyance obligations and rights to
earn couched in similar terms. The practice pointer would seem to be
that "agreements to transfer" are safer for the Farmor than "conditional
assignments," but even conditional assignments are probably safe if made
subject to the farmout agreement. As to the "40 acres in the form of a
square as nearly as possible" legal description, some additional language
could add some additional assurance that the legal description is enforce-
able. For example, the description could add "centered on the well with
the boundaries parallel to the boundaries of Section " It should
be made clear whether Farmor or Farmee has the right to describe the
forty-acre tract.
III. OIL, GAS AND MINERAL LEASES
A. PUGH CLAUSE
The lease involved in Geotrac Energy Corp. v. Gottschalk25 contained a
typical habendum clause in the printed form: "for a term of 3 years from
this date (called 'primary term') and as long thereafter as oil, gas or other
mineral is produced from said land hereunder. '26 The printed form ha-
bendum clause was then modified by an addendum which read:
Provided this lease is held by production at the expiration of the pri-
mary term, Lessee will have one (1) year after the expiration of the
primary term to drill an additional well, and if no such well is drilled,
then this lease will expire except to forty (40) acres around each pro-
ducing oil well and eighty (80) around each gas well. Two producing
wells will hold the entire leasehold described herein. 27
The lessee drilled a producer and a dry hole within the primary term.
Within a year after the primary term expired, lessee drilled another dry
hole. Lessor contended that the lease had terminated because of lessee's
failure to drill two producing wells. Lessee contended that one producing
well and the additional well it drilled after the expiration of the primary
term were all that was required to hold the entire lease.28
A decision for the lessor in the trial court on competing motions for
summary judgment was reversed and rendered on appeal. Neither party
contended the lease was ambiguous, and the court followed several well-
established general rules of construction in interpreting the lease. How-
ever, the two rules which the court found most persuasive are uniquely
applicable to oil and gas leases. "Language used by parties to an oil and
24. Id.
25. No. 03-95-00538-CV, 1996 WL 211016 (Tex. App.--Austin May 1, 1996, writ de-
nied) (withdrawn from publication).
26. Id. at *1.
27. Id.
28. Id. at *2.
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gas lease will not be held to impose a special limitation on the grant un-
less it is clear and precise and so unequivocal in nature that it can reason-
ably be given no other meaning. '29 If the language of an oil and gas lease
"is reasonably susceptible of a construction argued for by one of the par-
ties, that prevents a forfeiture, such construction is to be preferred to one
resulting in a forfeiture." 30 Applying these two rules, the court accepted
lessee's construction as offering an alternative that preserved the lease
and which was a reasonable interpretation of the addendum, which itself
did not "clearly, precisely and unequivocally" terminate the lease.3 1
B. ROYALTY CLAUSE
Heritage Resources, Inc. v. NationsBank32 clarifies the evolution of the
law pertaining to division orders and makes definitive some of the law
pertaining to the deductibility of post-production costs from royalty. The
leases involved differed in some respects, but each required that the roy-
alty for gas sold or used off the premises be based on "market value at the
well" and further provided that "there shall be no deductions from the
value of Lessor's royalty by reason of any required processing, cost of
dehydration, compression, transportation or other matter to market such
gas."'33 Heritage sold gas off the leased premises. Heritage deducted the
cost to transport the gas from the wellhead to the point of sale as a post-
production cost from the sales price before calculating royalties. Nations-
Bank sued Heritage contending that Heritage deducted transportation
costs from the value of NationsBank's royalty in violation of the leases,
although NationsBank conceded that the transportation costs deducted
were "reasonable." The contested issue was whether Heritage could de-
duct any transportation costs.
Royalty is usually subject to a proportionate part of post-production
costs, including taxes, treatment costs to render the production marketa-
ble, and transportation costs. Heritage contended that the royalty clause
defined the lessor's royalty as a fraction of the market value at the well,
and therefore reasonable transportation costs should be deducted. Na-
tionsBank argued that the lease language specifically prohibited this de-
duction. The court of appeals agreed with NationsBank and reasoned
that Heritage's interpretation would render the post-production clause
meaningless.34
The supreme court agreed that the post-production clause was mean-
ingless, but because the clause was "surplusage as a matter of law."' 35 It
29. Fox v. Thoreson, 398 S.W.2d 88, 92 (Tex. 1966).
30. Kincaid v. Gulf Oil Corp., 675 S.W.2d 250, 256 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
31. Geotrac, 1996 WL 211016 at *3.
32. 939 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. 1996).
33. Id. at 120.
34. Heritage Resources, Inc. v. NationsBank, 895 S.W.2d 833, 836 (Tex. App.-El
Paso 1995), rev'd, 939 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. 1996).
35. Heritage Resources, 939 S.W.2d at 123.
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held that "royalty" and "market value at the well" have commonly ac-
cepted meanings in the industry, and by applying those meanings, the
post-production clause merely restated existing law. 36 The case is signifi-
cant and is likely to be frequently cited for expressly defining these com-
mon industry terms. Those definitions are:
Royalty is commonly defined as the landowner's share of produc-
tion, free of expenses of production. Although it is not subject to the
costs of production, royalty is usually subject to post-production
costs, including taxes, treatment costs to render it marketable, and
transportation costs. However, the parties may modify this general
rule by agreement.
Market value at the well has a commonly accepted meaning in the
oil and gas industry. Market value is the price a willing seller obtains
from a willing buyer. There are two methods to determine market
value at the well.
The most desirable method is to use comparable sales. A compa-
rable sale is one that is comparable in time, quality, quantity, and
availability of marketing outlets.
Courts use the second method when information about compara-
ble sales is not readily available. This method involves subtracting
reasonable post-production marketing costs from the market value
at the point of sale. Post-production marketing costs include trans-
porting the gas to the market and processing the gas to make it mar-
ketable. With either method, the Plaintiff has the burden to prove
market value at the well. [citations omitted]. 37
In this particular case, the commonly accepted meanings of these terms
in the industry operated to defeat NationsBank's claim. The court rea-
soned that because the royalty payable was based on "market value at the
well" (which necessarily included deductions for post-production costs), a
subsequent recital that the "value of the Lessor's royalty" was not re-
duced by deductions for post-production costs merely restated existing
law. 38 Nevertheless, because the opinion expressly recognizes that the
meaning of "royalty" can be changed by agreement, a more artfully
worded royalty clause could accomplish the result sought by Nations-
Bank. For example, the result would have likely favored NationsBank if
the post-production clause had read:
In determining market value at the well there shall be no deductions
from the amount paid to Lessee by the first unrelated third-party
purchaser by reason of any required processing, cost of dehydration,
compression, transportation or other matter to market such gas, such
costs to be borne solely by Lessee.
Heritage Resources is also an important division order case. In the El
Paso Court, the division order issues were more important because Heri-
tage's first defense (post-production costs are deductible under the roy-
36. Id. at 122.
37. Id. at 121-22.
38. Id. at 123.
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alty clauses) failed, and it urged a second defense based on division
orders, which allowed the deduction of transportation costs. In the
supreme court the provisions of the division orders were no longer as
important, because those provisions were essentially consistent with the
royalty clauses in the leases, under the interpretation given to the royalty
clauses by Heritage and by the supreme court. Nevertheless, the supreme
court expressly disapproved of portions of the El Paso Court's opinion
which conflicted with Gavenda v. Strata Energy, Inc.39
The Heritage Resources opinion clarifies the result when division orders
prepared by the operator incorrectly allocate payments among the inter-
est owners in a manner that differs from the lease provisions, and the
operator retains a benefit. The division orders are not binding and the
operator is liable for the benefit retained, but only the benefit retained,
under the principle of unjust enrichment. 40 In other words, the lessee
who overpays himself at the expense of the royalty owner signing the
division order cannot hide behind the division order. If the wrongful pay-
ment has gone to someone else, the lessee can hide behind the division
order. Any other result would defeat the utility of the division order in
expediting payments and would further delay the orderly resolution of
title issues. This part of the decision should be very helpful in reducing
the confusion about the effectiveness of division orders. To recover any
payments made under a division order prior to revocation, the remedy
must be pursued against the party who ended up with the money, and a
claim can be pursued against that party only to the extent of the money
that party received. It is a bright line, a distinctive line, and fits within the
well-established legal doctrine of unjust enrichment.
In clarifying the effect of division orders, the decision is a good one. It
is hard to see how any party could complain. Don't sign a division order
and accept benefits, unless you are sure of your own interest. Once pay-
ments are made, you cannot recover for an underpayment against anyone
except the party receiving the unjust enrichment. In regards to "market
value" and "post production costs," this case will be dissected by lawyers
for years. In an era of gathering system spinoffs and increasing gathering
39. 705 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. 1986), cited in Heritage Resources, 939 S.W.2d at 123.
40. Heritage Resources, 939 S.W.2d at 123. In the Gavenda opinion, the case was re-
manded for a determination of the amount of royalty owed by Strata and the other work-
ing interest owner. Strata was only liable for whatever portion of the royalties it retained
and was not liable for any royalties it paid out to other owners. Gavenda, 705 S.W.2d at
692-93. Thus, Gavenda stands for the premise that, if the issuer of the division order makes
a mistake in the issuer's favor (and does not pay it over to another), then the issuer must
give up its unjust enrichment to the rightful owner. Presumably, the same recovery based
on unjust enrichment would be available against any overpaid party. The critical fact issue
is to determine who received the overpayment. This simple concept was unfortunately and
unnecessarily confused by a poorly reasoned opinion on remand in Strata Energy, Inc. v.
Gavenda, 753 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ), which held that
the operator was liable for overpayment made to overriding royalty owners, because it was
a benefit "retained" by the working interest owner, although the money was paid out to
the overriding royalty owners. The Heritage opinion effectively disapproves the opinion on
remand in the Gavenda case on this issue.
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costs, this will be an area of litigation for some time. The opinion clearly
does the industry a service by adopting in the highest court of the state a
principle that was widely believed to have been resolved: unless other-
wise agreed, market value at the well means net of post production costs.
Whether this particular lease royalty clause did or did not amount to
"otherwise agreed" is a closer question, but the underlying principles are
sound.
In Judice v. Mewbourne Oil Co.,4 1 Mewbourne deducted a pro rata
part of post-production compression costs from lessor's royalty. The roy-
alty under the leases was to be a fractional part of the "market value at
the well" of the gas produced.42 Relying upon Heritage Resources, supra,
decided the same day, the court held that under a market value royalty
clause the royalty is payable net of any value added by compressing the
gas after it leaves the wellhead.43 Therefore, Mewbourne was entitled
under its leases to allocate to the royalty owners their proportionate
share of the reasonable costs of post-production compression.44
Having settled the meaning of the royalty clause with respect to post-
production compression costs, the court turned to the effect to be given to
division orders executed by the lessors. One form of division order pro-
vided that settlement was to be based on "net proceeds realized at the
well" and deleted all of the rest of the form, which expressly allowed
deductions for compression costs. 45 The court ruled that "net proceeds"
expressly contemplates deductions and that its interpretation of "at the
well" means before value is added by preparing the gas for market.46 The
handwritten deletions did not change what was left in the division order,
so that under this division order, compression costs were deductible. A
second form of division order provided that settlement was to be based
on "gross proceeds realized at the well."'47 The court concluded this form
was ambiguous and allowed to stand a jury finding that the parties in-
tended that royalty was to be payable without deductions for
compression.48
C. Top LEASES
Hamman v. Bright & Co. 49 holds that a top lease violates the Texas
constitutional rule against perpetuities (the "Rule"), which provides that
"[P]erpetuities ... are contrary to the genius of free government, and
shall never be allowed."' 50 Under the Rule, no interest is valid unless it
41. No. 95-0115, 1996 LEXIS 42 (Tex. Apr. 25, 1996).
42. Id. at *3.
43. Id. at *4.
44. Id. at *4-5.
45. Id. at *5-6.
46. Id. at *7.
47. Id. at *5.
48. Id. at *8.
49. 924 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1996, writ granted).
50. TEX. CoNST. art. I, § 26.
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must vest, if at all, within twenty-one years after the death of some life or
lives in being at the time of the creation of the interest.51 The court is
careful to say that it does not hold that all top leases violate the Rule,
only that these particular top leases violated the Rule.52
The Hamman Ranch was leased in 1951 and 1952 and then top leased.
These top leases provided:
[T]his lease shall be for a term and period (now called "primary
term") covering and embracing, and including also, ten (10) years
after and subsequent to the forfeiture, or to the expiration, of said
lease [bottom leases] ....
It being particularly agreed and understood that during the exist-
ence and continuance of said prior lease that the rights, interests,
estate, privileges and royalties, as fixed thereby, of said Lessors shall
remain vested in and held and possessed by said Lessors, free of all
claims and demands whatsoever .... 53
The Rule is not applicable to present interests or future interests which
vest at their creation, so that the challenged top leases must be examined
as of the date the instruments were executed.54 The top leases are void,
if, by any possible contingency, the interest could vest outside the perpe-
tuities period. 55 The court reasoned that a lease creates a fee simple de-
terminable estate in the minerals, leaving a possibility of reverter in the
lessor.56 The possibility of a reverter is freely assignable, and because it is
a presently vested interest, it is not subject to the Rule. 57
However, an executory interest which cannot vest until a condition pre-
cedent occurs may be void under the Rule.58 The court concluded that
the language in these top leases evidenced an intent that the lessors
would remain fully vested with the possibility of reverter until the termi-
nation of the bottom leases.59 Because the top leases had the potential
for vesting outside the period provided by the Rule, the top leases were
void ab initio as future conveyances of springing executory interests. 60
The top leases had been expressly ratified, but the court held that "[a]n
agreement made in violation of the constitution or a statute is illegal and
absolutely void, and is not subject to ratification. '61 Therefore, top leases
void ab initio under the Rule cannot be ratified.62 From the opinion it is
not possible to tell how all the facts played out in this case, but it is easy
to imagine the significant economic issues which might arise if a void top
51. Hamman, 924 S.W.2d at 171.
52. Id. at 173 n.4.
53. Id. at 172.





59. Id. at 172.
60. Id. at 170, 172-173.




lease (even a ratified void top lease) is challenged after production is ob-
tained, and the lease is void ab initio.
Shortly after the top leases were granted, certain mineral interests were
conveyed by a deed reserving a perpetual one-sixteenth royalty interest
in the grantors. The conveyance was made subject to the bottom leases
and the top leases, reserved one-half of the royalty payable thereunder,
and "in event of the termination, forfeiture, or expiration of said leases,
as and when same may, respectively, so terminate, forfeit, or expire, a
perpetual non-participating free royalty interest .... ,,63 The court relied
upon Jupiter Oil Co. v. Snow64 to find that the lessors under this subse-
quent mineral deed retained one-half of the royalty payable under the
leases and the possibility of reverter.65 Out of the possibility of reverter,
the grantors also retained the described perpetual non-participating free
royalty interest, which did not violate the Rule.66
D. SURFACE DAMAGES
Oryx Energy Co. v. Shelton67 is a surface damages case based on exces-
sive use of surface rights under an oil and gas lease. Under the 1944
lease, the lessee drilled approximately fifty wells, and the suit com-
plaining of excessive use, negligence and pollution was brought against
Oryx in 1993. The trial court limited the claims against Oryx to actions of
Oryx which occured within the window permitted by the two-year statute
of limitations. 68
The court found there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's
finding that Oryx's use of the surface of the land was excessive. 69 The
court rejected the award of punitive damages, holding that there was no
evidence that Oryx's conduct was willful, wanton or malicious while con-
ducting its mineral operations. 70 There was evidence of abandoned rusty
equipment and pipelines, numerous oil and salt water spills, and the de-
struction of vegetation, but to recover, plaintiffs must produce evidence
that the defendant "proceed[ed] with conscious indifference to the rights,
safety, or welfare of others."' 71
E. OTHER MINERALS
TCA Building Co. v. Northwestern Resources Co.72 reviews the validity
of a ratification of a lignite mining lease that was void when originally
63. Id.
64. 819 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. 1991).
65. Id. at 468-69.
66. Hamman, 924 S.W.2d at 175.
67. No. 12-94-00045-CV (Tex. App.-yler Nov. 26, 1996, no writ) (not designated for
publication), 1996 WL 687025.
68. Id. at *1.
69. Id. at *4.
70. Id. at *5.
71. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.001(7)(B)(ii) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
72. 922 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. App.-Waco 1996, writ denied).
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granted. The lessor acquired the land from the Veterans Land Board
(VLB) under a purchase agreement which provided that title to the prop-
erty remained with the VLB until an amount owing under the agreement
was paid in full. Lessor leased the land to TU Electric in 1978 for a ten-
year term to mine coal and lignite. TU also acquired an option under
which it could pay to the VLB the remaining debt before the ten years
were over, thereby divesting the VLB of ownership, and activating a 35-
year option. 73  .I
At the time the lease and option were agreed upon, leases on surface
estates on VLB land for longer than ten years were prohibited, and all
lease options of any length on VLB surface estates were also prohib-
ited.74 In 1981, the law was amended to allow for lease terms of more
than ten years on VLB land as well as for lease options.75 In 1983 TU
Electric paid off the VLB debt, and in 1986 TU Electric assigned its rights
to Northwestern. Northwestern became concerned about the possible in-
validity of the lease, and in 1987 obtained a formal ratification from the
lessor. The lessor then sold the property to TCA.
TCA contended that the lease was void ab inito, but the court held that
so long as the invalidating condition is removed and a valid ratification
subsequently occurs, a previous void contract can be ratified. 76 The hold-
ing did not address whether a mere change in law will automatically ratify
a previously illegal contract; instead the holding rested solely on the
ground that the express ratification of a previously illegal agreement sub-
sequent to a change in the law that removes the illegality of the agree-
ment validates the original agreement.77
IV. DIVISION ORDERS
The two most important division order cases, Heritage Resources and
Judice, are discussed above in section III.B.
Mattalino v. Trinity Petroleum Exploration78 considers the effect of the
signing of a division order as a possible waiver. Mattalino developed
prospects for Trinity in exchange for compensation that included an as-
signment of an overriding royalty interest. As to a particular prospect,
Mattalino and Trinity had a dispute about the overriding royalty which
should have been assigned. Before the litigation was filed, Mattalino
signed division orders and accepted payments for several months without
complaint. Trinity argued that the signing of a division order by an exper-
ienced oil and gas man like Mattalino, coupled with his acceptance of the
reduced payments, waived his right to larger payments. The court held:
73. Id. at 632.
74. Act of June 15, 1977, 65th Leg., R.S., ch. 871, § 161.227,1977 Tex. Gen. Laws 2345,
2668 (current version codified as amended at TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN § 161.227
(Vernon 1993)).
75. Act of June 17, 1981, 67th Leg., R.S., ch. 812 § 1, 1981 Tex. Gen. Laws 3080.
76. TCA Building Co., 966 S.W.2d at 634.
77. Id.
78. 927 F. Supp. 986 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
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While the Texas Division Order Statute does not support Trinity's
contention that Mattalino waived his contractual rights as a matter of
law, signing the division order does count as evidence of an intent to
waive one's Rights. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 91.401(3)
([Vernon] 1978).
Without a factual dispute, the evidence of waiver is sufficient for
summary judgment. 79
V. EASEMENTS
In Valero Eastex Pipeline Co. v. Jarvis80 a pipeline condemned an ease-
ment expressly excepting the mineral rights, and, under the terms of the
easement, obligated itself to relocate the pipeline in the event of coal and
lignite mining activities.81 The trial court sua sponte removed the case
from the jury and refused to award the landowner any damages because
the taking was temporary. On appeal it was held that the pipeline was
entitled to condemn whatever interest was necessary for public use, but it
could not force the landowners to accept the pipeline's promise to move
its pipeline.8 2 A condemnor cannot make promissory statements regard-
ing its future intentions, the effect of which is to prevent a landowner
from recovering all damages in a single proceeding. The pipeline com-
pany and the landowner could agree that the pipeline company may from
time to time remain liable for future damages, but the courts will not
force such an agreement on landowners.83
VI. JOINT OPERATIONS
Mitchell Energy Corp. v. Samson Resources Co. 4 considers the duties
owed by a unit operator which fails to pay unleased cotenants and which
fails to pay lessors. Samson operated a unit which produced about fifteen
million dollars in gross revenues. Samson did not pay the owners of ap-
proximately 10% of unit production. Why Samson did not pay was a con-
tested fact question at trial, but apparently the jury did not like Samson's
explanation. Samson was stuck with three million dollars in actual dam-
ages and fifty million dollars in punitives. The verdict was based on fraud
and conversion.85
Mitchell was clearly an unleased cotenant. The jury found that certain
intervenors were also unleased cotenants, because Samson had repudi-
ated their leases by failing to pay royalties.86 The court found that mere
nonpayment of royalty does not terminate an oil and gas lease, and that
79. Id. at 989.
80. 926 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1996, writ denied).
81. Id. at 791.
82. Id. at 793.
83. Id.
84. 80 F.3d 976 (5th Cir. 1996).
85. Id. at 980-81.
86. Id. at 981.
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the remedy for nonpayment lies in an action for damages based on con-
tract.87 Therefore, the leases were still in effect and the intervenors were
to be treated as lessors, not as unleased cotenants.88
As to the intervening lessors, Samson had the right to take the produc-
tion without being liable for conversion. It was equally certain that any
cotenant has the right to extract minerals from the common property,
without the consent of the cotenant and without being liable for conver-
sion. The court could find no Texas case directly on point, but it went on
to hold that one cotenant is not liable to another for the tort of conver-
sion for failing to pay another cotenant the cotenant's share of the pro-
ceeds. 89 The cotenant's remedy is a right to an accounting, which is not a
tort remedy.90 Money can be the subject of conversion, but only when it
is in the form of a specific chattel, such as old coins.91 Similarly, not pay-
ing the royalty owners was not conversion.92
The other basis for a tort remedy was fraud. The finding of fraud was
based on Samson's failure to disclose material facts, i.e., that Samson
owed money. Absent a fiduciary or confidential relationship, the failure
to disclose information is not actionable as fraud. Because under Texas
law neither a cotenancy nor a lessor/lessee relationship imports a fiduci-
ary relationship, the court reversed on fraud.93 Both tort claims having
failed, the award of punitive damages was also reversed and vacated. 94
Samson's ultimate liability to its unpaid unleased cotenant was mea-
sured by the value of the gas produced less drilling and operating ex-
penses. Liability to the royalty owners was measured by the royalty
payments owed under the leases. Plaintiffs also recovered interest and
attorney's fees. 95
Imco Oil & Gas Co. v. Mitchell Energy Corp.96 involved multiple oper-
ating agreements on the same tract and multiple preferential rights to
purchase. Mobil, Texaco and Getty were each parties to a 1945 operating
agreement containing a preferential right to purchase. Westland earned
certain deep rights from Mobil and Getty, subject to the 1945 operating
agreement, and entered into a 1972 operating agreement with Mobil. The
1972 operating agreement contained preferential rights provisions identi-
cal to those in the 1945 operating agreement, and it was prepared with
signature spaces for all the other parties who owned working interests in
the field. Only Mobil and Westland signed the 1972 operating agreement.
Mitchell acquired Mobil's interest. Before closing its sale to Mitchell,
Mobil offered the property to Texaco (which had already acquired
87. Id. at 982.
88. Id. at 982-83.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 983.
91. Id. at 984.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 984-85.
94. Id. at 987.
95. Id. at 988.
96. 911 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1995, no writ).
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Getty's interest) under the 1945 operating agreement, and then to West-
land under the 1972 operating agreement. Both declined. Westland then
tried to sell its interest to Imco. Mitchell exercised its preferential right
under the 1945 operating agreement as acquired from Mobil. Imco sued
to try and avoid the preferential right.97
Imco contended that the 1972 operating agreement was ineffective be-
cause the additional signature blanks showed that the intent of the parties
was that the agreement was not to become binding unless signed by all of
those for whom blanks were provided. The issue had not previously been
addressed in Texas. Relying upon Florida authority, the court held that a
contract not signed by all of the parties will be valid unless the nature or
the wording of the contract indicates that it is not to become binding
unless and until it is fully executed.98 In this particular case, the court
also pointed to language at the beginning of the operating agreement
which referred to all of the signatory parties as evidence that the intent
was to bind any signatory party.99
Imco also contended that the 1972 operating agreement was ineffective
because its terms were inconsistent with the 1945 operating agreement.
The 1945 agreement named Mobil as operator of the field. The 1972
agreement named Westland as the operator of the deep rights. The court
reasoned that this was the same as Mobil hiring an independent contrac-
tor as operator, which would not relieve Mobil of its responsibilities to
Getty and Texaco, but instead only created additional duties and respon-
sibilities as between Mobil and Westland. 100 This was consistent with the
1945 agreement. Equally consistent was the sequence of the preferential
rights. The 1945 agreement contained the prior right, but the 1972 prefer-
ential right was equally valid, although subordinate to the 1945 right.101
The case is significant in exploring the relationship between multiple
operating agreements and multiple preferential rights to purchase. It is
apparently a case of first impression on the binding effect of partially exe-
cuted operating agreements. If an operating agreement is not to be bind-
ing unless fully executed, the practice pointer is to insert a recital that the
agreement is not to be binding upon any party unless and until it is fully
executed by all parties for whom signature blanks are provided.
Rogers v. Ricane Enterprises, Inc.102 was a decision written on remand
under instructions to consider the conversion issues raised by Rogers.
Production had occurred and had been taken by others from a property
in which Rogers owned a working interest. The significant legal issue was
to determine the applicable statute of limitations and whether the discov-
ery rule applied. The court held that oil and gas once removed from the
land becomes personalty and that conversion claims for personal prop-
97. Id. at 918.
98. Id. at 920.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 919.
101. Id.
102. 930 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1996, writ denied).
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erty are governed by a two-year limitations period which runs "not later
than two years after the cause of action accrues. '103
When a cause of action "accrues" is to be determined by the courts,
and the traditional rule in Texas is that the two-year statute begins to run
as soon as the owner suffers some injury, regardless of when the injury
becomes discoverable. The general rule in conversion cases is that the
limitations period begins to run at the time of the unlawful taking. How-
ever, if the original possession is not unlawful, the limitations period does
not begin to run until demand for possession has been made and refused,
or until the person in possession has unequivocally exercised acts of dom-
ination over the property inconsistent with the rights of the owner. 1°4
Rogers contended that the running of limitations should be tolled dur-
ing the period in which other issues of the case were being litigated. The
court held that nothing prevented Rogers from simultaneously pursuing a
conversion claim and that the two-year statute applied.'0 5
Rogers contended that the discovery rule should apply. "The rule pro-
vides that a statute of limitations does not run from a fixed date, but from
the time a plaintiff knew or should have known of the existence of facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action."'01 6 The court expressly rejected
Harrison v. Bass Enterprises Production Co. 107 as authority for the propo-
sition that a lower court cannot apply the discovery rule to a new set of
facts until it has first been applied to a similar set of facts by our supreme
court. The court relied heavily upon S.V. v. R.V.10 8 and quoted the fol-
lowing relevant excerpts:
Restated, the general principle is this: accrual of a cause of action is
deferred in cases of fraud or in which the wrongdoing is fraudulently
concealed, and in discovery rule cases in which the alleged wrongful
act and resulting injury were inherently undiscoverable at the time
they occurred but may be objectively verified. This principle, while
not expressed in every deferred accrual case, is derived from them
and best defines when the exception to the legal injury rule has been
and should be applied.
An injury is inherently undiscoverable if it is by nature unlikely to be
discovered within the prescribed limitations period despite due
diligence.'0 9
Because drilling and production was not concealed, the wells were openly
located on the premises, documents were of public record, and evidence
of production was not only available by visual inspection, but also
103. Id. at 165 (citing TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ArN. § 16.003(a) (Vernon Supp.
1996).
104. Id. at 166.
105. Id. at 167.
106. Id.
107. 888 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, no writ).
108. 933 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1996).
109. Rogers, 930 S.W.2d at 169.
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through Railroad Commission filings, the court held that the discovery
rule did not apply. 110
The court then analyzed the application of the two-year statute to the
various defendants under the specific facts applicable to each defendant.
The defendant under circumstances of most interest was the oil pur-
chaser. Southern Union was the purchaser of the oil belonging to Rog-
ers, but produced and sold by Torreyana. Rogers claimed that by
purchasing the oil, Southern Union became a convertor. Southern Union
claimed that it was a good faith buyer in the ordinary course of business
and was not a convertor under the Texas Uniform Commercial Code
(Texas UCC) and the jury findings."' The court agreed with Southern
Union and determined that for this defense to be applicable three ele-
ments must be present: "(1) an entrustment of goods to (2) a merchant
who deals in goods of that kind, followed by a sale by such merchant to
(3) a buyer in the ordinary course of business.""12
VII. GAS CONTRACTS
Lenape Resources Corp. v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co.'1 3 considers
whether "85% of Seller's delivery capacity" is a term sufficiently definite
for a gas purchase contract to be enforceable, or whether the "gap filler"
provisions of the uniform commercial code must be called upon to supply
the quantity term." 4 Tennessee, as purchaser, entered into a gas
purchase contract with Lenape's predecessor. This was a take-or-pay
contract right out of the good old days of the last boom. The contract
dedicated certain acreage and gave Lenape the discretion to drill more
wells or to unitize the acreage. Lenape was not obligated to deliver any
particular quantity, but Tennessee was obligated to take, or pay for if not
taken, "85% of Seller's delivery capacity.""15 When prices and demand
fell, Tennessee began taking unilateral action in the form of refusing to
take more than system demand or to pay prices above market.
Threatened with litigation for failure to develop by its lessors, Lenape
took action to cause additional drilling. The result was several new wells
located on acreage dedicated to the contract or on acreage pooled with
contract acreage. These new wells dramatically increased the volume of
production and Tennessee's potential liability for take-or-pay payments
or for taking gas in excess of its needs." 6
Tennessee contended that "85% of Seller's delivery capacity" was too
vague to be enforceable, but if it was enforceable, it was only because
output and requirements contracts under Texas UCC section 2.306 are
110. Id.
111. Id. at 170 (citing TEX Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.403(b), (c) (Tex. UCC)
(Vernon 1994)).
112. Id. at 171.
113. 925 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. 1996).
114. Id. at 569-70.
115. Id. at 569.
116. Id. at 567-68.
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made definite by reading into such contracts a quantity that is the actual
good faith output or requirements of a particular party not unreasonably
disproportionate to comparable prior output.117 Specifically, Tennessee
contended that requiring it to take or pay for this huge increase in pro-
duction would violate the good faith and proportionality requirements of
section 2.306. Other cases had clearly held that when section 2.306 was
applicable, no quantity unreasonably disproportionate to prior output
could be tendered.
Section 2.306 applies only if (1) the contract is an output contract and
(2) there is no express quantity term. Tennessee contended that the gas
contract was an "output" contract because the quantity term was mea-
sured by Lenape's delivery capacity. The court concluded that a take-or-
pay contract is not an "output" contract because an output contract is one
in which the buyer agrees to buy the seller's entire output.1 8 The "pay"
option under a take-or-pay option does not require the buyer to take any
gas. Thus, the buyer largely determines the quantity to be taken." 9
The supreme court also rejected Tennessee's claim because there was
an express quantity term. Section 2.306 is a gap-filler and may be varied
by the parties' agreement. 20 It fills in the quantity term only when a
contract does not unambiguously specify the quantity of the output of the
seller or the requirements of the buyer.12' This contract required Tennes-
see to purchase a set quantity of gas produced from the committed
reserves, which was defined as 85% of Lenape's delivery capacity. The
court found that this quantity was a readily ascertainable quantity pro-
duced by a simple mathematical calculation. Therefore section 2.306 did
not apply.' 22 The court agreed with Tennessee that there was an applica-
ble good faith standard, but not the one found in Texas UCC section
2.306. The applicable standard is found in section 1.203 as defined in sec-
tions 1.201(19) (honesty in fact) and section 2.103(a)(2) (observance of
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade). "The
[Texas] UCC limits Tennessee's take-or-pay obligations to good faith in-
creases in delivery capacity.' 23
Transamerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Finkelstein124 addressed the right
of an overriding royalty owner to share in repudiation damages for repu-
diation of a take-or-pay gas contract as to that portion of the gas actually
produced and sold in the spot market. When El Paso Natural Gas farmed
out the La Perla Ranch to Transamerican's predecessor in 1975, Finkel-
stein earned an overriding royalty on the property. El Paso retained a
117. Id. at 569 (citing TEX Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.306 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon
1994)).
118. Id. at 569-70.
119. Id.
120. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.102(c) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1994).
121. Id. § 2.306(a).
122. Lenape, 925 S.W.2d at 570-73.
123. Id. at 571.
124. 933 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, writ requested).
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preferential right to purchase the gas under the terms of the farmout,
which it exercised in 1981 by entering into a long term take-or-pay con-
tract with Transamerican's predecessor and which also included Finkel-
stein's gas. 12 5
El Paso's attempts to avoid the take-or-pay contract resulted in litiga-
tion and a judgment against El Paso in favor of Transamerican for take-
or-pay damages in excess of sixty million dollars and repudiation dam-
ages in excess of four hundred million dollars. The jury findings on dam-
ages corresponded exactly to Transamerican's experts' testimony as to the
present value of the difference between El Paso's required price under
the contract and the February, 1987 (date of repudiation) spot market
price for the gas. El Paso then settled by conveying its La Perla Ranch
minerals and cash to El Paso, and by canceling the 1975 farmout and the
1981 gas contract, thereby settling all claims of Transamerican and its "as-
signs." This resulted in a washout of Finkelstein's interest in La Perla
Ranch minerals. 126
When Transamerican refused to pay Finkelstein any part of the settle-
ment, Finkelstein sued. Because Killam Oil Co. v. Bruni127 made it clear
that Finkelstein had no hope of sharing in settlement proceeds attributa-
ble to take-or-pay settlement payments, Finkelstein sought to recover a
share of the repudiation damages allocable to the overriding royalty on
gas produced and attributable to his interest prior to the washout. He
obtained favorable jury findings on breach of the duty to reasonably mar-
ket and unjust enrichment by contending that Transamerican had essen-
tially been paid twice for the gas. Transamerican had sold the gas on the
spot market to mitigate its losses, for which it paid Finkelstein his overrid-
ing royalty. Transamerican also had received repudiation damages attrib-
utable to the produced gas, for which it paid Finkelstein nothing. 128
In the panel opinion (attached as an Appendix to the opinion as a dis-
sent), the court accepted Finkelstein's argument that repudiation dam-
ages and take-or-pay damages were distinct, and because Bruni left open
the question of a royalty owner's right to share in "nonrecoupable" pay-
ments, Bruni was inapplicable. 129 Because the gas had actually been pro-
duced, Finkelstein was permitted a recovery. In its opinion on Motion for
Rehearing En Banc, the court reversed and rendered, because a royalty
owner is not entitled to settlement proceeds from a take-or-pay contract,
absent lease language to that effect, whether or not gas is sold to third
parties on the spot market.'30
The court reasoned that its opinion in Bruni was fundamentally based
on the idea that royalty is usually only payable for gas actually extracted
125. Id. at 594.
126. Id.
127. 806 S.W.2d 264 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, writ denied).
128. Finkelstein, 933 S.W.2d at 594-95.
129. Id. at 599.
130. Id. at 593.
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from the land, 131 and that this view had recently been confirmed by the
Texas Supreme Court when it described a take-or-pay payment as com-
pensation "for the exclusive dedication of reserves for a fixed period of
time."'1 32 In other words, take-or-pay payments are made for gas notpro-
duced, and thus bear no royalty.
The court concluded that Finkelstein's overriding royalty was also pay-
able on gas actually produced. 33 Awards as damages for nonpayment of
take-or-pay payments or for repudiation both represent payments for
nonproduction. 34 The court held that Lenape resolves the issue of
whether the non-recoupable take-or-pay payment is compensation for
past and/or future gas production or for storing the gas through its expla-
nation that take-or-pay payments represent compensation for the exclu-
sive dedication of reserves for a fixed period of time.135 Take-or-pay is
not a benefit which flows from the marketing covenant of the lease, which
only requires that Finkelstein be paid for the gas produced and sold on
the spot market. 1.36 The court summarily dismissed Finkelstein's unjust
enrichment argument as not available when the same subject is covered
by an express contract. 137
The original opinion in Enserch Corp. v. Rebich138 was withdrawn by
the court, and a new opinion was issued on Motion for Rehearing.' 39 In
that case, the applicable gas contract was executed in 1980 for a term of
fifteen years and called for pricing to be tied "'to the maximum lawful
price for Section 102 ... gas,' as determined by the federal government
under the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA).' 40 The Section 102
gas price was calculated monthly by the Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission using a formula that resulted in a progressively escalating price
that has significantly exceeded the market price for gas. When the gas
market collapsed, Enserch unilaterally began paying at a market rate in
1984. For the next 100 months Rebich and his predecessors simply ac-
cepted the lower prices. In 1985 gas prices on domestic wells were der-
egulated, so that there was no longer a "maximum lawful price."
Deregulation, however, did not end the publication of a Section 102
price, although the price published after deregulation pertained to the
type of Section 102 gas produced offshore. In January of 1993 the NGPA
was repealed, and the government ceased publishing the Section 102
price altogether.
131. Id. at 597.
132. Id. (citing Lenape Resources Corp., 925 S.W.2d at 570).
133. Id. at 598
134. Id. at 599.
135. Id. at 598.
136. Id. at 600.
137. Id.
138. No. 12-93-00303-CV, 1995 WL 574240 (Tex. App.-Tyler Sept. 29 1995) (with-
drawn), reported in Richard F. Brown, Oil, Gas, and Mineral Law, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 49 SMU L. REV. 1177, 1195 (1996).
139. 925 S.W.2d 75 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1996, writ dism'd by agr.).
140. Id. at 78.
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Rebich filed suit in April of 1993 to recover the underpayment for gas
for the four years preceding the date that his suit was filed. The trial
court granted summary judgement for Rebich, and the judgment also
fixed the price from March of 1993 (when the Section 103 price ceased to
be published) until the expiration of the contract in 1995 at the last pub-
lished Section 102 price. The Tyler Court initially affirmed, but on re-
hearing remanded on the issue of modification. The interesting issue in
the case was Enserch's argument that "maximum lawful price" was the
controlling phrase, which the court conceded had no meaning after 1985.
Nevertheless, the remainder of the contract terminology, "for Section 102
: . . gas" remained. The court concluded that the parties selected this
index for their pricing scheme, and it provided a certain and definite
meaning. 141
Enserch argued that there were other possible interpretations render-
ing the contract ambiguous, or at least not subject to summary judgment.
In particular, Enserch contended that the contract was silent as to a post-
deregulation price, and therefore upon deregulation a commercially rea-
sonable price or the last regulated price should control. The court re-
jected this argument because the parties knew in 1980 when they entered
into the contract that gas prices would be deregulated in 1985, and there-
fore there would be no "maximum lawful price" thereafter. It was not
reasonable to interpret the contract as having no pricing provision appli-
cable to the final two-thirds of the contract period.142
None of Rebich's predecessors expressly consented to the lower prices,
but none objected, and they each negotiated their checks without a reser-
vation of rights.143 Enserch raised affirmative defenses of waiver, estop-
pel, novation, ratification, amendment and modification. Modification,
ratification, amendment and novation were each initially rejected, be-
cause any revision of the contract was required to have been in writing
and signed. 144 On rehearing the court was forced to consider each of
these issues in detail because the statute of frauds was not pled by
Rebich. Waiver, estoppel, novation and ratification were quickly re-
jected, but amendment and modification raised a fact issue requiring that
the case be remanded.145 Specifically, the court concluded that the acqui-
escence and acceptance without objection of the reduced prices raised a
fact issue as to whether the price modifications were impliedly accepted
by Rebich's predecessors. 146
The significance of the case is that there may still be a number of these
old "maximum lawful price" contracts still in effect, and under which pro-
ducers have taken an inert position similar to the facts in this case. The
opinion suggests that for these producers, assuming they plead the statute
141. Id. at 80.
142. Id. at 81.
143. Id.
144. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01(b)(6) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1995).
145. Enserch Corp., 925 S.W.2d at 81-84.
146. Id. at 84.
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of frauds, there may be an avenue of recovery still open against their
purchaser.
VIII. REGULATION
Railroad Commission of Texas v. Torch Operating Co.147 holds that the
Commission had the statutory authority to exempt a subsequent operator
from temporary field rules based on lack of notice and that the evidence
was sufficient to support a finding that the subsequent operator should be
exempted from the temporary field rules.148
Kilroy drilled the discovery well and a development well in the Bam-
mel, North (6,100' Cockfield) Field. Kilroy applied for temporary field
rules to change the spacing and density requirements from forty-acre pro-
ration units under statewide rules to six hundred forty-acre proration
units. Goodrich also held operating rights under leases in the Bammel
Field. Goodrich applied for a drilling permit under statewide rules,
before any temporary rules were established for the Bammel Field. Tem-
porary field rules were then adopted, but ten days later the Commission
issued Goodrich a permit on the basis of statewide rules. The Commis-
sion even later allowed Goodrich to amend its application again under
statewide rules. However, when Goodrich finally completed drilling its
well, the Commission refused to issue an allowable to the well because it
was not drilled in accordance with the applicable temporary field rules.' 49
Torch succeeded Kilroy and complained that Goodrich was producing
without an assigned allowable. The Goodrich well was shut in, and the
Commission convened a contested case to review the period during
which the temporary field rules were in effect. 150
Statewide Rule 43 requires that an applicant for a temporary field rule
provide the agency with a list of the names and addresses of all operators
holding leases on land touching the tract on which the discovery well is
located.' 5' Goodrich held leased acreage abutting the pooled unit for
Kilroy's discovery well, although Goodrich's lease did not touch the pro-
ration unit assigned to the discovery well. Kilroy did not provide Good-
rich's name to the Commission, and Goodrich was not notified of the
hearing. Kilroy had actual knowledge of Goodrich's competitive position
in the Bammel Field and knew that Goodrich would be affected by the
proposed temporary field rules.152
The court noted that due process attaches to the property rights that
arise from a mineral estate and that the Commission is required by stat-
ute to ensure that no rule or order is adopted by the agency except after
147. 912 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. 1995).
148. Id. at 790-91.
149. Id. at 791.
150. Id.
151. 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.43 (West 1996) (Tex. R.R. Comm'n, Application for
Temporary Field Rules).
152. Torch Operating Co., 912 S.W.2d at 792.
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adequate notice and a hearing have been provided.153 Therefore the
Commission could decide that Goodrich was not bound by the temporary
field rules and was entitled to makeup the production lost during the pe-
riod the well was shut-in.1 54
153. Id.
154. Id.
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